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COMPETITION EFFECTS FROM PATIENT
MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effects of reimbursement for medical tourism within the European
Union. We use a spatial competition framework to study the effects on prices, quali-
ties and patient flows between two countries. Patient mobility increases with the imple-
mentation of reimbursement mechanisms. The resulting equilibria in prices and qualities
depend on the rule of reimbursements and possible differences in country specific parame-
ters. Soft budget constraints that public providers may have, pose a competitive advantage
over private providers and divert demand toward the former. Supranational coordination
concerning soft budgets constraints is needed to address the potentially detrimental effects
on aggregate welfare.
Keywords: Cross-border Directive, Soft budgets, Patient mobility, Quality competition
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1 Introduction
Medical tourism describes the situation in which an individual travels outside his country
of residence with the purpose of receiving medical treatment. According to the Com-
mission of the European Communities (2006), total costs of cross-border care within the
European Union, including unplanned treatments, amount to circa one percent (e10bn)
of public spending on healthcare.1 Council Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of
patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (in the following: the Directive) aims to "im-
prove the functioning of the internal market and the free movement of goods, persons and
services [in the domain of healthcare]."2 The Directive clearly defines the entitlements
to reimbursement for planned healthcare in EU Member states outside the state of affil-
iation. It also makes the requirement of prior authorisation for treatments the exception
rather than the rule.3 In the light of these circumstances this paper analyses the effects of
the Directive on qualities and prices of healthcare in EU Member States and the arising
patient mobility when different rules of reimbursement for cross-border care apply.
With entry into force, patients that are entitled to a particular treatment in their country of
affiliation are likewise eligible to receive reimbursement up to the cost of that particular
treatment when seeking treatment in another EU member state. Each member state is
required to establish a national contact point for cross-border care that provides outgoing
patients with information about their entitlements and incoming patients about national
quality and safety standards. Healthcare providers are obliged to inform enquirers on
quality and safety standards as well as prices.Insurance providers or public authorities re-
spectively must clearly state the full range of benefits and terms of reimbursement. Unlike
EU-regulation that had already been in place prior to the Directive, the latter applies to all
1There is no more recent and convincing data on the scale of planned cross-border care. The reason for
that is because data is collected at a national level and many agencies do not differentiate between planned
and unplanned care during the process of data collection and creation.
2OJ L88, 4.4.2011, p. 45
3Member States are allowed to introduce a system of prior authorisation for inpatient care, for highly
specialised and cost-intense healthcare and in specific cases relating to quality or safety by the particular
provider in question (OJ L88/45, 4.4.2011, p. 59).
3
healthcare providers in the EU. For the abovementioned reasons patient mobility is ex-
pected to increase over the next few years since EU member countries had to implement
national law that is in line with the Directive by the end of 2013.
The details on how and at what level the transfers for reimbursement shall be made are
not further specified in the Directive and were left to be worked out by Member States. In
this work reimbursement is implemented at the patient-level allowing to draw direct infer-
ences on the change of patients’ incentives and the resulting behaviour. Costs for medical
treatments are usually (partially) covered by some form of insurance such that the price
at the point of provision the patient has to bear does not reflect the full cost of treatment.
The status-quo prior to the implementation of the Directive (PRE4) is assumed to not pro-
vide for any sort of reimbursement for planned healthcare abroad.5 We will consider two
different possibilities of reimbursing patients. The first (POST) is a fixed copayment rate
in which the patient is reimbursed the part of the (assumed) cost that his insurance would
have covered if the patient underwent treatment in his home country. This scenario proba-
bly constitutes the most straightforward interpretation of the conditions on reimbursement
as they are set out in the Directive. The second reimbursement scheme is considered for
possible policy implications. Patients are reimbursed with a fixed rate (FRR) on the total
costs of treatment independent of where the treatment was performed.
Irrespective of the scenario we find a tendency that is driven by supply-side cost sharing
to provide quality above the aggregate welfare maximising level. Mobility prior to the
implementation of the Directive is low as cost sharing is only available for treatments in
the patients’ home country. The resulting differences in net prices soften price compe-
tition between providers and limit mobility. The implementation of the Directive leads
to an increase in mobility as reimbursement for treatment abroad acts like domestic cost
sharing and decreases the relative net price difference to patients. The rule on which re-
4The abbreviations PRE, POST and FRR will be used throughout this work to refer to the corresponding
situation as they are outlined in this section.
5This is not entirely true as the cases of cases of Kohl ([1998] 158 C 96 (ECR) ) and Decker ([1998] 120
C 95 (ECR)) illustrate. The Directive originates from a legislative void that the case law rulings created.
Nonetheless, we consider the assumption of zero reimbursement to serve as a benchmark to clearly illustrate
the effects and not to reflect absolute values.
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imbursement is based on determines the degree of price and quality competition between
providers. In POST, price competition between providers is intensified, leading to lower
prices and levels of quality. Providers’ profits decrease but patients’ benefits increase. The
opposite holds true in FRR. Looking at competition between private and public providers
we conclude that the latter holds a competitive advantage diverting demand toward its
direction. Having one provider operate under a soft budget constraint may be beneficial
to overall welfare due to the increased benefits from higher qualities to that provider’s
patients. Each country has incentives to introduce soft budget constraints, but bilateral
introduction harms aggregate welfare compared to the situation with hard budget con-
straints. Furthermore, unilateral introduction of soft budgets causes a bias in quality and
welfare between countries. Patients that are treated by the provider that operates under
the hard budget constraint are worse off as that provider offers lower levels of quality. In
order to avoid a potentially welfare decreasing situation in which policy makers end up
in a prisoner’s dilemma when having to decide on whether or not to allow soft budgets,
public providers should also be put under a hard budget constraint. If the public provider
operates under a global budget its decisions greatly depend on the amount it obtains for
treatments. In POST this pushes demand toward the private provider, while it attracts
demand under FRR. Allowing the public provider to price discriminate against potential
patients from abroad benefits domestic patients when price competition is soft and may
harm them when price competition is stiff. When price competition is soft, qualities are
the main tool to compete with for patients. As qualities are common to the type of patient
domestic patients benefit from higher qualities at a constant price.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section places this work in
context with existing literature, before the model is introduced in Section 3. The model
is then analysed for the cases of price competition (Section 4), optimal qualities (Section
5) and price and quality competition (Section 6). Section 7 analyses the implications of




There exist a wide array of literature on spatial competition models that feature aspects
of vertical and horizontal differentiation employing a setting à la Hotelling (1929). Ma
and Burgess (1993) were one of the first to use this framework to analyse the interde-
pendencies between price and quality decisions in the domain of healthcare. They argue
that levels of quality provision are below the social optimum as pricing decisions tend to
undercut additional profits from attracting patients by offering higher qualities. The same
strategic effects of quality are present in this paper but cost-sharing between patients and
an exogenous insurance provider leads to excess provision of quality compared to the
social optimum. The setup they employ is able to draw preliminary inferences on equi-
librium behaviour of firms but is mainly focused on supply-side aspects.
Other literature extended their framework to analyse inter-regional competition in mar-
kets for healthcare provision. However, to the knowledge of the author, none of these
works would allow simultaneous flows of patients between regions (countries). Typically,
the focus lies on the effects of a difference in supply-side factors, that (mostly) result in a
one-sided diversion of demand toward one of the providers (e.g. Aiura 2013).
Brekke et al. (2014) address the same Directive as this work but focus on policy aspects
rather than competition effects. Policy makers of each region, that differ in their costs of
quality provision, decide on qualities and tax levels to finance expenditures while medical
treatment is free at the point of use. Their work analyses the effect of different trans-
fer payment schemes between regions on financing, welfare and patient flows. Their
approach is not suitable to answer questions regarding the effects on competition and
resulting mobility. To be able to infer on equilibrium behavior that stems from the imple-
mentation of reimbursement for medical tourism, it requires that patients do not have to
bear the full cost of domestic treatment in first place as the resulting equilibria when re-
imbursement is present or not would otherwise only depend on patients’ price reservation
values. Similar to Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) we introduce copayment schemes
6
that cover parts of the expenses for domestic treatments. To allow for simultaneous patient
flows between countries we will need to introduce a second line segment.
3 Model
Consider the market for the provision of medical care in two different EU member states
(A and B) each represented by a linear segment Li = [0,1], i∈{a,b}. In each country there
exist a single healthcare provider. The provider of country A is located at the left end-
point whereas the provider of country B is located at the right endpoint of the segments.
Customers (patients) are uniformly distributed on the segment lines with a total mass per
segment normalized to 1 and each patient demands one unit of healthcare per episode.
Patients have an insurance contract (y, si), where si ∈ [0,1] is the patients’ copayment rate
and can be interpreted as the demand-side cost-sharing (Ellis and McGuire, 1993). The
insurance contributes with (1− si) to the cost of treatment. Insurance is mandatory and
insurance costs y are sunk at this time. Utility of a patient residing in country A located
at xa is given by the following two terms when seeking treatment domestic or abroad:
V (A,xa) = v+qa− sa pa− τxa; V (B,xa) = v+qb− pb +ωa− (1− τ)xa
And analogous for residents of country B located at xb:
V (A,xb) = v+qa− pa +ωb− τxb; V (B,xb) = v+qb− sb pb− (1− τ)xb,
where v > 0 is the gross patient surplus, qi is the level of quality offered by provider i, pi
is the price charged by provider i, si is the patient’s coinsurance rate in case of domestic
treatment and ωi is the reimbursement payment in case of treatment abroad.6 τ is the
marginal disutility of traveling and can also be interpreted as the inverse of the degree of
competition between providers. v is assumed to be large enough to ensure full market
coverage. The assumptions ωa < pb and ωb < pa are required for consistency and as
6The assumption that patients’ gross surplus might differ depending on the country of treatment (e.g. it
may be greater at home than abroad due to cultural preferences) only affects the position of the indifferent
consumers. This possibility is not further elaborated as it only changes the magnitude of effects but does
not affect the qualitative results derived in this work.
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to prevent arbitrage possibilities in line with the Directive. A lower bound on quality in
compliance with EU norms is normalised to zero. Reimbursement will vary according to
different schemes as depicted in the first section:
I) No reimbursement: ωi = 0 (PRE)
II) Fixed copayment rate : ωi = (1− si)pi (POST)
III) Fixed reimbursement rate : ωi = (1− si)p j, i 6= j (FRR)
We define η = (1−α−β )(1+ sa) + 2α + β (sa + sb) and ψ = (1− γ−δ )(1+ sb) +
2δ + γ (sa + sb) ; α,β ,γ,δ ∈ {0,1} ,α +β ≤ 1,γ + δ ≤ 1. Table 1 displays the parame-
ter settings that correspond to each specific scenario of reimbursement. The resident of
country i that is indifferent between seeking treatment domestic or abroad is located at
V (a, x̃i) =V (b, x̃i). It follows that:












Residents located left to the indifferent consumer seek treatment at provider A, while
those situated right of it consult provider B. Hence, demands for providers are given by
Da = x̃a + x̃b and Db = (2− x̃a− x̃b), respectively.
Table 1: Parameters values defining reimbursement scenarios
ωa ωb
PRE α = β = γ = δ = 0 0 0
POST α = δ = 1,β = γ = 0 (1− sa)pa (1− sb)pb
FRR β = γ = 1,α = δ = 0 (1− sa)pb (1− sb)pa
4 Price Competition
Assuming levels of quality as equal and given by qi = q and marginal cost of healthcare
provision equal to zero, the indifferent consumers are located at:
x̃a = 12 +
pb−sa pa−ωa






while providers’ profits are given by: πa = (x̃a + x̃b) pa and πb = (2− x̃a− x̃b) pb. Dif-
ferentiating the profit functions with respect to prices and solving the set of first order
conditions we obtain optimal prices:
p∗a = 2τη
−1; p∗b = 2τψ
−1.
Table 2 displays prices, profits and indifferent consumers for all considered scenarios.7
For either country prices and profits under different reimbursement rules are ranked in
descending order: FRR >PRE >POST ∀si ∈ (0,1) , i ∈ {a,b}.
Without financial support for being treated outside the country of residence no mobility
occurs for equal coinsurance rates when patients have to bear less than a third of treat-
ment costs.8 Domestic prices are independent from foreign coinsurance rates as long as
reimbursement is not defined in terms of foreign prices as in FRR. The marginal effect of
an increase in patients’ coinsurance rate on countries’ total costs, constituted of insurer’s
and insurees’ expenditures, is strictly negative (− 3−si
(1+si)3
τ).9 While the marginal effect on
total expenditures of patients is positive, as ∂ pi
∂ si
≤ 0 but ∂ (pisi)
∂ si
≥ 0, the decrease in costs
of the insurer due to lower prices and less domestic treatments outweighs the increase in
patients’ costs. Higher coinsurance rates stiffen price competition.
Table 2: Prices, profits and indifferent consumers under different schemes
Prices Profits Indifferent Consumers


















POST pa = pb = τ πa = πb = τ x̃a = x̃b = 12
FRR pa = pb = 2sa+sb τ πa = πb =
2
sa+sb
τ x̃a = x̃b = 12
7Holds true for indifferent consumers in the pre-directive scenario only for 3sb sa + sa + sb ≥ 1. If this
condition is not met x̃a = 1 and x̃b = 0 what equals a situation without mobility.
8According to a study of the European Parliament, dental care put aside, patients’ coinsurance rates
in the EU on average usually don’t exceed 20%. Dental care is one of the areas where medical tourism is
already more active in Europe, giving support to this observation.
9Insurance costs are given by TCIa = (1− sa) · pa · x̃a and TCIb = (1− sb) · pb · (1− x̃b) respectively.
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When at least one country introduces a regime of fixed copayments to its residents, patient
mobility in both countries is increased. Under such regime the domestic provider has
incentives to lower prices for two reasons. Firstly, a lower domestic price retains some
domestic patients while it attracts more foreign patients. Secondly, as reimbursement
is expressed as a fraction of the domestic price, monetary incentives for being treated
abroad diminish. If reimbursement was introduced unilaterally the provider in the country
where no such mechanism exists would keep prices unchanged. The outflow of domestic
patients that are lost as a result of the lower prices abroad are matched with an inflow
of foreign patients. The latter are attracted due to the availability of copayments for
treatments abroad that reduces their net price. Mobility is increased in both directions,
leading -from a patient’s view- to a pareto-superior outcome. The reasoning for lowering
prices applies to both providers when fixed co-payments are in place in both countries
(POST) as providers cannot coordinate on higher prices. This results in a situation in
which both providers serve half of each country’s market and yields the largest mobility
in the considered scenarios.
While a fixed reimbursement rate leads to the same degree of mobility, prices and private
profits are the highest of all scenarios. Adjusting one’s own prices has no direct effect on
the absolute amount of domestic patients’ reimbursement for seeking care abroad. A price
increase renders treatments less attractive to all patients. However, patients only have to
pay the same proportion of prices independent from the place of treatment. Therefore
higher foreign nominal prices do not translate equally into larger net prices to the patients.
This attracts a sufficient amount of foreign patients to offset the foregone profits due to an
outflow of domestic patients. Price competition is relaxed when both providers operate
under such regime; enabling them to charge substantially higher prices compared to the
situation without reimbursements. Hence, the regime of fixed copayment is preferred to
the fixed reimbursement rate when having to decide based on prices only.
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Price Discrimination and Welfare
Article 4 of the Directive stipulates non-discrimination with regard to nationality and re-
quires providers to apply the same scale of fees to both domestic and foreign patients.10
Assume for this section that providers may engage in third-degree price discrimination
according to country of origin. Denote pi j the price provider i charges patients of country
j, (i, j) ∈ {A,B}. Further assume that patients must be reimbursed based on the prices
that are available to them when choosing between providers. To evaluate the effect of
price discrimination under the different scenarios define national welfare as the sum of
provider’s profits, residents’ utility from treatment and total costs of healthcare. Refer
to Appendix A for a formal definition of the welfare functions, the adjusted optimisation
problems and the resulting equilibria. Differences in eligibility for coinsurance translate
into different demand elasticities for treatments abroad and at home. Providers charge a
lower price to the group with the more elastic demand, namely foreign patients. In PRE
foreign patients benefit from lower prices while prices for domestic treatment are higher.
The aggregate effect on consumer welfare is positive as the increased price competition
for foreign patients induces mobility and minimises transportation costs. Overall welfare
is always at least as high when allowing price discrimination in the case where equal coin-
surance rates apply in both countries. In FRR welfare is higher in the country with the
higher coinsurance rate as a higher coinsurance rate, ceteris paribus, stiffens price com-
petition and leads to lower prices for residents of that country. Under the specifications
in this section price discrimination leads to an outcome that satisfies the Kaldor–Hicks
efficiency criterion.
5 Quality
In this section we establish the national and supranational optimal levels of quality assum-
ing that national welfare is defined by the sum of its population’s utility and provider’s
profits deducted by the domestic insurance’s copayments. Sticking to the assumption that
10OJ L88, 4.4.2011, p. 56
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marginal costs of provision are constant and equal to zero we specify the cost function of
quality provision to take the commonly used (e.g. Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2012))
quadratic form Ci(qi) = θi2 qi
2, where θi is a technology parameter. Unless specified oth-
erwise we will assume technology parameters to be equal in both countries (θa = θb) for



























Profits that are generated from domestic patients do not add to national welfare as they
create no value. Providers’ contribution to welfare is therefore limited to profits from
treating foreign patients and quality provision. National welfare is strictly increasing in
the former, and strictly decreasing in foregone profits and payments to the foreign provider
that result from outbound patient mobility. Thus there exists a bias toward less outbound
and more inbound mobility compared to aggregate welfare as this definition of national
welfare gives a larger weight to profits than consumer welfare. Establishing conditions for
supranational collaboration in welfare optimisation is beyond the scope of this paper.11
Due to the strict relationship between prices and national welfare consider the vector




= qa−qb + pb−4xaτ +2τ = 0, (4)
∂WB
∂xb
= qa−qb− pa−4xbτ +2τ = 0, (5)
∂WA
∂qa
= xa−θaqa = 0, (6)
∂WB
∂qb
= (1− xb)−θbqb = 0. (7)
From equations (4) and (5) it follows:
11The interested reader may refer to (Brekke et al., 2014) who analyse possibilities for transfer policies
in a similar context.
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xa = 12 +
qa−qb+pb





Looking at the resulting first-best demand share of the local market and (6) and (7) we
take note of the fact that from an isolated perspective national quality levels and market
shares exceeding those of the integrated outcome are desirable.
With a supranational utilitarian approach equity is no concern and the optimal location
of the indifferent consumer is given by: x̃i = 12 +
qa−qb
4τ . First-best levels of quality are
obtained by substituting x̃i into (6) and (7) and yield: qi = 12θi . For equal technology pa-
rameters, the symmetry implies that the indifferent consumers shall be located equidistant
from the endpoints in order to minimise total transporation costs. When technologies dif-
fer the provider with lower costs of quality provision (smaller θi) should provide a higher
level of quality than its competitor and serve more than half of each population.
6 Price and Quality Competition
This section analyses the effects of the Directive when providers compete in prices and
qualities. We will look at the situation in which providers choose both prices and qualities
simultaneously and the situation in which they set quality levels before deciding on prices.
Within the range of the Directive the sequential setting is the more relevant one as it more
accurately describes not easily reversible investments in cost-intense long-term equipment
as it is more common in the secondary and tertiary levels of care.
6.1 Simultaneous Decisions
Profits are by definition the difference between revenues and costs:
πa = (x̃a + x̃b) pa− θa2 qa
2; πb = (2− x̃a− x̃b) pb− θb2 qb
2. (8)
Indifferent consumers are given by equation (1). From the first order conditions for profit
maximisation with respect to prices and qualities, it follows that optimal prices and qual-
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Figure 1 displays the three resulting symmetric equilibria. Without any reimbursement
mechanism in place qualities and prices are higher in the country where patients’ coinsur-
ance rate is lower. Higher coinsurance rates, ceteris paribus, soften price competition as
domestic treatments become relatively more expensive compared to undergoing treatment
abroad. Providers react with an increase in quality to attract and retain patients as quality
levels are the predominant tool to compete with under relaxed price competition. The
zero reimbursement scheme has the lowest potential to induce patient mobility. However,
for abovementioned reasons mobility increases the lower the coinsurance rates are.
For the case of fixed copayment rates, quality and price levels are equal in both countries
amounting to qa = qb = 1θ and pa = pb = τ for equal technology. Price but also quality
levels are the lowest of all scenarios considered. For the same reasons as in the pure price
competition game providers decrease prices compared to the scenario of no reimburse-
ment. Accordingly, attracting patients via the quality instrument becomes less profitable
the lower the prices are. This results in a quality decrease in comparison to the scenario
of no reimbursement. Patients that sought treatment abroad prior to the implementation
of reimbursement benefit the most. Patients in the immediate vicinity of providers are
worse off. The aggregate effect on consumer welfare is positive and total transporation
costs are minimized as providers serve half of each country’s population. This feature is
shared under the fixed reimbursement rate but at higher prices and quality levels. The ra-
tionale behind the price increase is the same as in the section about price competition. As
higher prices translate into higher net profits per patient under the assumption of constant









Figure 1: Symmetric equilibrium choice of qualities
marginal costs providers compete for patients by investing in quality. When a provider
can produce quality more efficiently (smaller θi) that provider will offer a higher level of
quality and charge higher prices than his counterpart. That provider attracts more patients
in each scenario and satisfies more than half the demand when one of the reimbursement
mechanisms is installed. In the latter cases this is independent of coinsurance rates.
While the supranational first-best allocation of patients is achieved when introducing the
same reimbursement scheme in both countries quality is too high in all of the above sce-
narios. Even under the system of fixed copayments the realised quality levels are twice as
large as the first best level. The problem of excess quality arises as both providers face the
same private incentives for increasing their profits by attracting additional patients via the
quality mechanism. A unilateral introduction of fixed copayments would lead to a higher
level of quality in the country that does not offer reimbursement to its residents and we
can expect total costs of healthcare to be higher in this case.
6.2 Sequential Decisions
In the first stage of the sequential decision game providers simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose qualities qi. After having observed the decision on qualities providers si-
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multaneously and independently decide on prices pi. Solving by backward induction with
price correspondences already given by (9) and (10) we obtain:








Without further computation it is apparent that quality levels are lower than in the simul-
taneous decision game. The ranking established in the simultaneous game persists. The
problem of excess quality remains but is alleviated, e.g. quality levels in case of fixed
copayments only exceed the optimal ones by one third. Potential differences in coinsur-
ance rates and technologies between countries do not translate into as big differences in
the provided levels of quality as in the simultaneous game. Ceteris paribus, price differ-
ences are not as pronounced and consequently mobility is less responsive to differences
in country specific characteristics.
7 Soft Budget
Until now we have assumed that both providers are private firms and did not consider the
possibility that one of the providers is a statutory corporation. As a proxy for competition
between private and public providers we will model the public provider to operate under a
soft budget constraint. Similar to Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2015) and Wright (2015)
this is attained by adding a positive probability of "bail out" in case of negative profits.
With probability λ > 0 a cost shock increases the marginal cost of healthcare provision
proportionally to providers’ prices by ∆c = k pi, with k > 1. Sticking to the assumption
of zero marginal cost of provision, providers’ price-cost margins are given as follows:
(pi− c) =

(pi−0) = pi > 0 with probability (1−λ )
(pi−∆c) = (1− k) pi < 0 with probability λ
(15)
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Providers incur losses when the shock occurs. With probability 1 > b > 0 the public
provider is bailed out by its national government and the losses are matched. There is no
such support for the private provider. All price and quality decisions are made prior to the
realisation of the shock and are therefore not state dependent. We assume λ ≤ 1k to obtain
equilibria for which the private provider voluntarily offers nonnegative levels of quality.
Assume that provider A is the public provider. Providers are risk neutral and maximise
expected profits:
πa = λ (x̃a + x̃b)(1− k)(1−b) pa +(1−λ )(x̃a + x̃b) pa− θa2 qa
2
πb = λ (2− x̃a− x̃b)(1− k) pb +(1−λ )(2− x̃a− x̃b) pb− θb2 qb
2
(16)
7.1 Price Equilibrium under Soft Budget Constraints
Price correspondences are again given by equations (9) and (10). Differentiating the above





Ra−qaθa = 0, ∂πb∂qb =
pb
τ
Rb−qbθb = 0, (17)
where Ra = (1− k λ + bλ (k− 1)) and Rb = (1− k λ ), with 1 > Ra > Rb > 0, are risk
adjustment factors. Substituting the price correspondences in the above equations gives
quality correspondences for simultaneous price and quality decisions:
θaqa = 23η (
qa−qb+3τ
τ




It becomes apparent that the above best correspondences are the same as in the previous
section, multiplied by the risk adjustment factors.13 Some qualitative features emerge
quickly. As the public provider only has to bear a fraction of its potential losses in ex-
pectancy it can profitably invest in higher quality and consequently charge higher prices
than the private counterpart. Ceteris paribus, the soft budget constraint results in a dis-
tortion of patient flows toward the public provider in all scenarios. Furthermore, the pri-
13This also holds true for the sequential game in which best correspondences are given by (13) multiplied
by Ra and (14) by Rb, respectively.
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vate provider’s competitive (dis)advantages it might have over the public provider due to
exogenous factors, such as technology and copayment rates, are (more) less pronounced.
This is particularly harmful when the private provider can provide quality more efficiently.
The socially optimal levels of quality are unaffected by the possibility of a shock as neither
costs, nor consumer welfare depend on the realisation of the state. The realised qualities
depend on the probability and the magnitude of the shock and can either be too high or
low.
7.2 Global Budget
In many publicly funded systems healthcare is free at the point of use for contributors.
Accordingly, foreign patients have to be charged a different price than domestic patients
as no comparable price for domestic patients exists. The Directive mandates to calculate
a non-discriminatory, objective price for foreign patients in that case.14
Suppose that the public provider of country A is granted a fixed sum per episode of
treatment for domestic patients, denoted Pa. The exact amount is predetermined and an-
nounced before providers decide on qualities and prices. Therefore there exist no asym-
metric information between providers.15 We will first look at the situation in which the
fixed price is charged independently from the origin of patients. Equation (17) hence im-
plies fixed levels of quality for provider A. In a second scenario the public provider is free
to determine the price it charges to foreign patients. This may be justified as for example
national tariffs for reimbursing hospitals that operate under the National Health Services
of the United Kingdom might not reflect the pure cost of treatment. Those rates may
be inaccurate when applied to foreign patients as they also cover costs for the primary
diagnosis that is typically performed before seeking treatment abroad.
7.2.1 Prospective Payment
The public provider is reimbursed with Pa for treating domestic patients and is obliged to
charge foreign patients the same amount as price for treatment, denoted pab. Indifferent
14Note that sa = 0 reflects the case of full insurance coverage.
15Asymmetric information between providers would have a similar effect as demand uncertainty on the
private provider’s side.
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consumers are defined by:












For now we have Pa = pab. Therefore it does not make a difference which of the two
prices is used to define reimbursements. Provider B’s profit function is equal to the one
in equation (16) while provider A’s is given by:
πa = λ (x̃a Pa + x̃b pab)(1− k)(1−b)+(1−λ )(x̃aPa + x̃b pab)− θa2 qa
2 (20)





With no leeway to charge different prices to foreigners, provider A’s level of quality is










Substituting the above equation into (17) we obtain quality correspondences as follows:








While provider A’s qualities are not responsive to any strategic choice of provider B the
effects on quality levels and mobility are not per se clear. Solving (21) and (23) with
Pa = pab for optimal qualities we obtain:
qb =
Pa(η τ θa−2Ra)+2τ2θa
2τ θa (ψ τ θb−Rb)
Rb; qa = Paτ θa Ra.
(24)
The private provider’s level of quality does not only depend on the amount provider A is
reimbursed with but also on the difference in costs of quality provision and the degree of
competition between providers (transportation costs). In fact when technology parame-
ters do not differ substantially from one another the private provider will only offer larger
19
levels of quality for sufficiently small compensation of the public provider.16 To better
understand the behaviour of providers first consider why provider A chooses the same
quality levels in each scenario. Assuming that providers do not differ drastically in their
ability to produce quality (condition I) and that the regulated price of the public provider
is sufficiently high (condition II) provider B will undercut the fixed price of provider A
to attract more patients when there is no reimbursement mechanism in place. In order to
retain some of the patients provider A has to offer a higher level of quality. As provider
B mainly attracts patients by offering lower prices it does not have to compete as heavily
in qualities. The same effect occurs when there is a system of fixed copayment rates in
place. The public provider wants to lower prices for motives described in the previous
section but is not allowed to and thus has to offer higher qualities to create demand for
its services. With fixed reimbursement rates in place price competition is dampened and
consequently qualities become the main tool to compete with. The condition that reim-
bursement cannot exceed the domestic price limits the private provider’s ability to take
full advantage. As the public provider is not free to increase prices it will also keep quali-
ties unchanged. Provider A’s strategies are limited to using qualities to compete with. The
author is aware that the constant levels of quality provision of the public provider arise
with the assumed simple quadratic separable cost function that does not affect marginal
costs of provision. When the public provider’s payment per treatment is low so is its bud-
get to provide quality. In that case the private provider will offer higher quality levels than
the heavily budget constrained public provider.
7.2.2 Price Discrimination and Prospective Payment
As neither costs nor prices are clearly defined in the Directive there exist some leeway
in interpreting both terms. This relates to the decision on what prices shall be applied to
foreigners and what constitutes the assumed costs when reimbursing residents that were
treated abroad. The public provider is still reimbursed with Pa for treating domestic pa-
16The conditions are: I: 2Ra ψ θb−Rb η θa ≥ 0 and II: 0 < paa < 2Rb τ θa2Ra ψ θb−Rb η θa . For equal coinsurance
rates provider B will only offer higher qualities than provider A when the former’s technology to produce
quality is approximately more than twice as efficient.
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tients but is free to charge a different price pab to foreign patients. We will consider the
possibilities for reimbursing residents of country A based on either of these two prices.
Patients of country B will always be reimbursed based on pab under a regime of FRR.
Recall that θa qa =
Pa+pab
2τ Ra. Therefore, provider A’s level of quality will only be larger
compared to the situation in which both its prices are equal and fixed when pab > Pa. We
acknowledge that market equilibria do not solely depend on the level of Pa but also on
costs of quality provision, transportation costs, coinsurance rates, reimbursement scenar-
ios and risk adjustment factors and the differences in these variables between countries.
The following discussion is based on the assumption that Pa was set at a reasonable level
in the sense that it does not cause extreme outcomes compared to the unregulated mar-
ket outcome.17 All arguments are made on a ceteris paribus basis. Consider the public
provider’s incentives for setting prices and qualities when no reimbursement is present.
The one-sided possibility to price discriminate against foreign patients stiffens price com-
petition for that group. The public provider will compete more aggressively than its pri-
vate counterpart because lowering the price to foreign patients only affects the position
of the domestic marginal consumer by the resulting change in equilibrium values but not
the revenue per domestic patient. This results in both providers’ prices for residents of
country B as well as the overall levels of quality to decrease. The public provider and
patients of country B benefit the most. The former is able to increase its profits, while the
latter face lower prices but also lower qualities independent from the place of treatment.
Residents of country B will on average benefit. The opposite is true for patients of country
A. Patients that remain at home are charged the same fixed price at a lower level of qual-
ity. The benefits of those that seek treatment abroad due to lower prices is not expected to
offset the effect on overall consumer welfare as provider B will not substantially decrease
its prices and its qualities are also lower. Mobility between the two countries increases.
With fixed copayment rates the outcome depends on which price constitutes the basis for
reimbursement in country A. When reimbursement is based on the local fixed price the
17If it was set at a very high level the public provider would generally charge lower prices to foreign
patients and vice versa.
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public provider’s only incentive to lower pab is to attract foreign demand but not to de-
crease domestic patients’ monetary incentives for being treated abroad. Therefore, the
provided levels of quality will be higher. Residents of country A will benefit from the
higher quality when being treated at home and from the inability of the public provider to
decrease the absolute reimbursement when seeking care abroad. Provider B will decrease
prices for reasons outlined in earlier sections. A larger number of residents of country
A will seek treatment abroad as the opposite holds true for country B. The overall effect
on country A’s welfare is ambigious and depends on realised parameter values. However,
we can expect consumer welfare to be higher when reimbursement is based on the fixed
price. The effect on provider A’s profit is ambiguous and depends on the ratio of incom-
ing and outgoing patients as well as the difference between prices charged to the two
groups. With fixed reimbursement rates and price discrimination patients of country A
enjoy greater levels of quality at a constant price when being treated at home as provider
A will raise prices to foreigners resulting in higher levels of quality. Patients of country
B are again worse off only enjoying a slight increase in qualities at higher prices.
Operating under a soft budget constraint constitutes a competitive advantage and it alle-
viates the disadvantage that arise when facing pricing restrictions. As the magnitude of
the shock in marginal costs is directly related to providers’ pricing decisions it acts like a
buffer. A softer (harder) public budget therefore enables the provider to set higher (lower)
prices. This becomes more relevant when the intensity of price competition is low (FRR)
and less relevant when price competition is fierce (POST).
Summarizing the public provider benefits from being able to price discriminate, ceteris
paribus. Residents of that very same country benefit in situations in which reimbursement
mechanisms are installed. Vice versa this is detrimental to the private provider’s profits
and residents’ welfare of that country in POST and FRR. From a patient’s point of view
it is favourable to define reimbursements based on the fixed domestic price to limit the
provider’s effort of decreasing absolute monetary reimbursement for treatment abroad.
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8 Conclusion
This work has focused on patient mobility and the competition effects in the European
Union that result from a directive aimed at facilitating patient mobility. In particular,
it has analysed how providers respond to different mechanisms of reimbursement at the
patient-level. We witness an excess provision of quality compared to the social optimum
that is inherent to the model due to cost sharing between patients and external insurance
providers. Patient flows between countries increase when entitlements to reimbursement
for cross-border are introduced. This paper contributes to the understanding on how qual-
ity and price levels depend on the basis by which reimbursement is defined. The Directive
does not address this important question in greater detail and it remains unclear whether it
was appropriately considered when translating the principles of the Directive into national
law. With increasing public deficits and costs in healthcare in Europe the fixed copayment
rates constitute the most desireable option as they increase the intensity of price compe-
tition between providers. Total costs are the lowest of all considered scenarios while the
optimal level of mobility is attained. Fixed reimbursement rates move qualities further
away from the social optimum and result in the highest total costs. On the notion of
costs, we find that allowing for price discrimination according to the origin of patients
increases the price competition for that group, resulting in lower prices to foreign patients
and higher overall welfare at the expense of patients that remain in their country of resi-
dence for treatment.
In a situation in which private and public providers compete with one another the softer
budget constraint of the latter constitutes a competitive advantage. When not restricted in
pricing decisions the soft budget diverts demand toward the public provider that translates
into higher expected profits at the expense of the private provider. The advantage to the
public provider is larger the softer the price competition is. The reimbursement scheme
greatly affects the outcome on welfare. In the PRE scenario the effect on national welfare
is ambiguous. For a sufficiently high degree of price competition there exist a welfare
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maximising positive probability for bailout as it induces inward mobility and increases
domestic patients’ benefits. If bailout is too likely to occur the public provider harms
expected welfare by overinvesting in quality and consequently charging higher prices that
increase expected losses. In the POST scenario welfare in both countries may increase
when prices are sufficiently low to start with as foregone profits of the private provider
are then relatively small compared to possible benefits to patients. When the intensity
of price competition is high the resulting qualities will be low. Ceteris paribus, a higher
probability of bailout than in PRE will be optimal as inducing quality provision is dis-
proportionately beneficial to welfare for low qualities due to the quadratic nature of the
cost function. The softened price competition in FRR results in a higher level of prices
and therefore, ceteris paribus, decreases the optimal probability of bailout. Note that the
benefit to inbound foreign patients is the highest under this scenario.
From the perspective of national welfare soft budgets are desirable as it enables the local
provider to captivate demand and increases the level of quality to domestic patients. When
both providers operate under soft budget constraints the added national welfare that re-
sults from treating a larger proportion of patients diminishes. Consequently, soft budgets
may decrease expected national welfare in both countries. Each country would prefer to
operate as sole country with soft budget constraints and we may end up in a prisoner’s
dilemma in which a unilateral introduction of soft budgets may increase welfare in both
countries but soft budgets in both countries decrease welfare. Aggregate consumer wel-
fare in both countries increases when at least one provider operates under a soft budget.
However, in the country in which a private provider operates, patients that remain at home
for treatment are worse off as the domestic level of quality decreases. When the shock
materialises the government of the country with the public provider indirectly subsidises
foreign patients. For these reason and the bias in national welfare soft budget constraints
pose they should be carefully evaluated on the grounds of equity and efficiency.
The author, of course, is aware that this model is characterised by several simplifying
assumptions. There is a number of possible realistic extensions, e.g. increasing marginal
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costs dependent on quality; addressing endogenous balanced budgets of third parties;
among many other possibilities. However, the author expects the general conclusions on
the competition effects between providers to be robust to extensions to the model.
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Appendices
A Price Discrimination and Welfare
Indifferent consumers are located at:
x̃a = 12 +
pba−sa paa−ωa






while providers’ profits are given by:
πa = x̃a paa + x̃b pab; and πb = (1− x̃a)pba +(1− x̃b)pbb. (A-2)
The notation for ωi is straightfoward and based on p ji, where ( j, i) designate the origin of
provider j and patient i. Table A1 contains the resulting equilibria when price discrimi-
nation by country of origin is allowed.
Table A1: Prices, profits and indifferent consumers with price discrimination
Prices Profits Indifferent Consumers
PRE
paa = 1sa τ, pba = τ,







τ x̃a = x̃b = 12
POST
paa = pba = τ ,
pbb = pab = τ
πa = πb = τ x̃a = x̃b = 12
FRR
paa = pba = 1sa τ ,
pbb = pab = 1sb τ
πa = πb =
sa+sb
2sasb





(v− τ xa )dxa +
∫ 1
xa







(v− pa − τ xb )dxb +
∫ 1
xb





B Price and Quality Competition






























−θb qb = 0. (B-4)
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